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COMMENTARY ON CLASS SETTLEMENTS UNDER ATTACK
CATHERINE T. STRUVE†
In Class Settlements Under Attack, Professors Samuel Issacharoff and 
Richard Nagareda proffer “a cohesive framework for establishing the 
finality of class actions under the real-world conditions of settle-
ment.”1  Their framework addresses three key questions concerning 
class settlement review:  Where should judicial review of the settle-
ment take place?  What due process concerns can be raised in the 
course of such a review?  And what form should the challenge take?2
Their insightful article performs a great service by setting forth so 
comprehensively and thoughtfully the range of questions implicated 
by the question of finality in the context of class settlements, and I 
have learned a great deal from their treatment of these issues.  The 
space constraints of this Commentary, though, counsel me to com-
press my praise for the article’s many strengths and to focus my re-
marks on some remaining questions that occur to me. 
Like the supporters of the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), Issa-
charoff and Nagareda ground their proposal in the concept of the 
“anomalous court.”3  For CAFA supporters, the concern was the 
“anomalous” state courts—also termed “judicial hellholes”—that were 
willing improperly to certify a nationwide class action.  CAFA ad-
dresses this concern by “mak[ing] it much easier for defendants to 
remove to federal court proposed nationwide class actions involving 
high-stakes, state law claims originally filed in state court.”4  But, as 
Professor Tobias Wolff has pointed out, by failing to provide for re-
moval by class members, CAFA leaves such members at the mercy of 
collusive class settlements in anomalous state courts.5  Collateral at-
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1 Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under Attack, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 1649, 1651 (2008). 
2 See id. at 1655 (“[P]roper preclusion in the class action setting flows from proper 
coordination of what we term the ‘where,’ ‘what,’ and ‘how’ of class settlement review.”). 
3 Id.
4 Id. at 1663. 
5 See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of the Na-
tionwide Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2039 (2008) (noting that CAFA “offers no 
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tacks provide one means of addressing the concern about collusive 
class settlements.  Issacharoff and Nagareda, however, argue that reli-
ance on collateral review as a means of policing collusive class settle-
ments recreates the problem of the “anomalous court” in a different 
posture, because some courts may be willing to take anomalously hos-
tile views of the validity of a challenged class settlement.6
Recalling the debate over the strength and implications of the 
evidence concerning anomalously certification-friendly state courts,7 I 
am prompted to wonder how much evidence currently exists concern-
ing the existence of anomalously settlement-hostile state courts.  The 
article’s focus on the need to disempower anomalous state courts 
would be curious unless there were evidence that state courts are 
more likely than federal courts to render anomalous decisions on col-
lateral attacks of class action settlements.  It is intriguing in this regard 
that, with respect to intraclass conflicts, the case the authors single out 
for criticism is Stephenson v. Dow Chemical Co.—a decision rendered not 
by a state court but by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.8
It is possible, in any event, that not much rides on the authors’ fo-
cus on the possibility of anomalous state court (as opposed to federal
court) collateral-attack decisions, because at this juncture in the arti-
cle the authors do not appear to argue for a significant change in ex-
isting law.  As they note, when the rendering forum is a federal court, 
that court can enforce its judgment through the use of antisuit injunc-
tions to bar collateral challenges.  Thus, as they put it, “the existing 
law of judicial federalism disempowers the ability of an anomalous 
mechanism by which absent class plaintiffs can act independently of class counsel to 
move their lawsuits into federal court”). 
6 See Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 1, at 1670 (“The problem . . . is that the 
search for an anomalous forum might allow collateral attacks on class settlement to 
bust not only bad class judgments, but also good ones.”). 
7 Compare, e.g., Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action Counterreformation, 57 STAN.
L. REV. 1475, 1516 (2005) (“[T]here is doubt that the data supports [CAFA’s] whole-
sale jurisdictional shift.”), and David Marcus, Erie, the Class Action Fairness Act, and Some 
Federalism Implications of Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247, 1294 (2007) 
(suggesting that “[s]tates’ responses to magnet jurisdictions in their midst” indicate 
the “questionable” nature of assertions concerning the “need for a federal solution to 
class action abuse at the state level”), with, e.g., John H. Beisner & Jessica Davidson 
Miller, They’re Making a Federal Case Out of It . . . in State Court, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 143, 204 (2001) (“By assembling another substantial body of data confirming 
that certain state courts have become ‘magnets’ for multi-state and nationwide class 
actions, the Manhattan Institute research further demonstrates the need for federal 
legislation to address current anomalies in the federal diversity jurisdiction statute.”). 
8 See Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 1, at 1687-89 (citing Stephenson v. Dow 
Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
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state court to authorize a collateral attack on a federal court class 
judgment.”9
Thus, in my view, the authors’ more momentous prescription 
concerns the content, rather than the venue, of collateral review.  
They would cabin the scope of collateral review, providing such review 
only for “structural problems that target either the power of the ren-
dering court to act or the integrity of the judicial process for objection 
before that court.”10  The authors assert that “performance defects” 
(e.g., flaws in class counsel’s performance that lead to inadequate set-
tlement terms for class members) ordinarily should not be cognizable 
on collateral review.  So long as there was “a full and fair opportunity 
to raise” such defects in the original class proceeding, they argue, col-
lateral review of performance defects should be unavailable.11
The authors’ reliance on a distinction between structural defects 
(such as intraclass conflicts or lawyer conflicts of interest) and per-
formance defects seems to me to overlook an epistemic problem.  It is 
not always easy to draw the line between structural conflicts that mat-
ter and those that do not.  Courts can and do examine the terms of a 
class settlement for clues concerning the nature and significance of 
any asserted structural conflicts.12
Interestingly, the authors themselves suggest that courts can rely 
on the settlement’s terms to explain away a structural conflict.  As they 
assert, “the particular content of the settlement chosen, when it is 
known, properly informs the inquiry into whether an asserted differ-
ence within the class should matter for structural purposes.”13  The au-
thors do not state explicitly whether their framework would permit 
the use of settlement terms as evidence to establish (rather than rebut)
assertions of structural conflict.14  If the authors mean to exclude the 
9 Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 1, at 1670. 
10 Id. at 1713. 
11 Id. at 1719. 
12 For instance, the Supreme Court in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 
591, 627 (1997), focused on “the terms of the settlement [and] the structure of the 
negotiations” when reviewing the question of intraclass conflicts.  Explaining its 
agreement with the Third Circuit’s finding on the intraclass conflict issue, the Court 
noted:  “[T]he terms of the settlement reflect essential allocation decisions designed to 
confine compensation and to limit defendants’ liability.  For example, . . . the settle-
ment includes no adjustment for inflation; only a few claimants per year can opt out at 
the back end; and loss-of-consortium claims are extinguished with no compensation.”  Id.
13 Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 1, at 1695. 
14 The authors draw “two . . . implications” from their view of intraclass conflicts.  
One is that “distinctions drawn by the class settlement . . . cannot render the class rep-
resentation inadequate where no structural conflict existed at the time of the class 
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use of settlement terms as evidence of structural conflict, their view 
that settlement terms can “dissipate structural conflicts within the 
class”15 might seem to function as a one-way ratchet.  If the authors 
would concede that evidence concerning settlement terms can help 
establish (as well as mitigate) structural conflict, such a concession 
would underscore the difficulty of drawing a bright line between per-
formance defects and structural defects. 
The authors’ discussion of settlement terms that might dissipate 
structural conflicts is nonetheless intriguing.  In light of the authors’ 
emphasis on the value of finality in class litigation, it is interesting to 
ask whether one could devise settlement features that could obviate a 
class structure problem without diminishing the judgment’s finality.  
Back-end opt-out rights, as the authors recognize, would not meet 
such a test.16  The other example mentioned by the authors—
conditioning attorneys’ fees on “the actual operation of the settlement 
regime over time”17—seems more promising in this regard, in the 
sense that it would not impair finality but might align counsel’s incen-
tives with those of the class members, based on the ultimate results 
under the settlement.  A regime that restricts judicial review of class 
settlements (as the authors advocate) should give particular attention 
to other ways of policing the quality of class settlements, and—as the 
authors note—tying attorney compensation more tightly to attorney 
performance could be a step in that direction. 
More generally, the authors model their suggested approach to 
collateral review of structural defects on the doctrine of issue preclu-
sion.  They argue that “the existence of a determination by the ren-
dering court” on the relevant structural-defect issue “properly may 
trigger preclusion” in the context of a collateral challenge.18  They 
carefully note that their proposal departs from traditional issue-
preclusion doctrine by rejecting “a conventional conception of ‘party’ 
status, whereby the plaintiff in a collateral attack can be bound only by 
the rejection of a structural objection that she herself has raised in the 
rendering court.”19  What matters, they contend, is not who raised the 
judgment.”  The second is that “design features of the class settlement might . . . dissi-
pate structural conflicts within the class.”  Id. at 1685.  
15 See id.
16 See id. at 1694 (“It is true, of course, that settlements that preserve a great deal 
of litigant autonomy may not actually yield peace.”). 
17 Id.
18 Id. at 1716. 
19 Id.
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defect, but what the rendering court did with the issue:  the rendering 
court must “articulate the alleged [structural] defect and explain why 
it is not disabling.”20  As others have noted,21 it seems odd to apply is-
sue preclusion to the very determination of whether the class member 
should be bound by the judgment. 
But beyond that, it seems important to ask precisely how the au-
thors’ proposed standard would work.  The authors suggest that the 
standard would serve an information-forcing function, “effectively 
creating an incentive for settling counsel to build a body of evidence 
to elicit and support the rendering court’s determination of structural 
defects with the potential to form the grounds for collateral attack.”22
The authors do not specify how much evidence settling counsel must 
provide in order to get the benefit of the proposed preclusion rule.  
What if settling counsel provide some but not all of the available evi-
dence on the relevant structural-conflict issue, and what if the collat-
eral challenger seeks to adduce a much stronger body of evidence on 
the same structural-conflict issue?  Would a collateral challenge be al-
lowed in that situation?  If not, then the authors’ proposal might 
merely create an incentive for settling counsel to submit a minimum 
amount of evidence on possible structural conflicts—just enough to 
form the basis for a preclusion argument, but not enough to inform 
fully the rendering court’s determination of the issue. 
The authors’ contribution of this article greatly enriched the par-
ticipants’ discussion of the Symposium topic—the Class Action Fair-
ness Act—by providing a deeply textured account of class settlement 
review in the post-CAFA world.  But it seems useful to ask to what ex-
tent CAFA itself supports the authors’ proposals concerning preclu-
sion in the context of class settlements.  Though the authors periodi-
cally suggest that their preclusion proposals address CAFA’s policy 
concerns and apply the statute’s underlying purposes,23 they wisely 
20 Id. at 1717. 
21 As an example, see id. at 1716 n.208, Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda cite 
the Epstein II court’s reasoning:  “The individual objectors who voluntarily appeared at 
the fairness hearing were not authorized by the absentees to represent their interests, 
nor were they certified by the state to do so.  Their appearance at the hearing did not 
bind anyone but themselves to an adjudication of adequacy of representation.”  Ep-
stein v. MCA, Inc., 126 F.3d 1235, 1242 (9th Cir. 1997), superseded by 179 F.3d 641 (9th 
Cir. 1999). 
22 Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 1, at 1718. 
23 See, e.g., id. at 1651-52 (”[T]he policy implications of collateral challenge raise 
many of the same concerns as animated [CAFA].”); id. at 1655 (asserting that both 
CAFA and discussions of finality of class settlements “focus, in substantial part, on how 
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stop short of claiming strongly that CAFA itself supports their pre-
scriptions.  As Professor Lonny Hoffman suggested during the Sympo-
sium discussion, one should be wary of reading CAFA to support pol-
icy initiatives that the statute itself does not reach. 
As the authors note, CAFA “devotes little discussion to th[e] sub-
ject” of class settlement review.24  But of the scant evidence that can be 
drawn from CAFA, at least as much would seem to weigh against the 
authors’ preclusion proposals as in favor of them.  CAFA purports to 
show solicitude not just for the problem of the anomalous forum, but 
also for the quality of class settlement terms.  The statutory findings 
express concerns about coupon settlements, exorbitant attorneys’ 
fees, and inequities among plaintiffs.25  Section 1712 addresses cou-
pon settlements by imposing strictures on attorneys’ fees and setting 
requirements for judicial scrutiny.26  Section 1713 requires special 
findings before a court approves a settlement that would result in a 
net loss to a class member.27  Section 1714 imposes restraints on set-
tlements that discriminate among class members based on geogra-
phy.28  And, notably, to enforce section 1715’s requirements concern-
ing notice to federal and state officials, section 1715(e) specifically 
authorizes collateral challenges in the event that the required notice is 
not provided.29  There is no reason to think that section 1715(e)’s col-
lateral-challenge provision is directed only to cases of structural con-
flict; and indeed, it may be most useful in cases where the defects are 
performance related, since those are among the cases in which one 
might expect that notice to federal and state officials could produce 
salutary objections during the settlement-approval process. 
to address the problem of the anomalous court in a world of national markets”); id. at 
1659 (advocating a framework for collateral review “that simultaneously accounts for 
the differing meanings of inadequate representation, the fiduciary role of the court on 
direct review, and the provision of a federal forum in CAFA for class actions of national 
significance”); id. at 1659 (contending that “greater preclusion should flow from use of 
the congressionally preferred forum”); id. at 1722 (“[O]nce Congress has interceded 
to determine the forum in which cases of national import should be adjudicated, doc-
trines that permit any court to revisit class judgments at any time . . . lose whatever core 
justification they may once have enjoyed.”). 
24 Id. at 1660. 
25 28 U.S.C. § 1711 note (Supp. V 2005). 
26 Id. § 1712. 
27 Id. § 1713. 
28 Id. § 1714. 
29 Id. § 1715. 
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Thus, CAFA itself does not, in the end, seem to lend strong sup-
port to the authors’ vision concerning the scope of collateral review.  
If anything, by leaving class members vulnerable to the possibility of 
collusive state court settlements, CAFA may underscore the advisabil-
ity of preserving a less constricted form of collateral review.30
30 It is possible that the availability of other protective mechanisms might help to 
allay this concern.  See, e.g., Wolff, supra note 5, at 2131 (arguing that if courts adopt his 
proposals “regarding antisuit injunctions, . . . then the occasions for entertaining col-
lateral challenges will diminish”). 
